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I. INTRODUCTION 
Deed construction has been a perennial task for courts virtually 
since the Statute of Uses accorded legal approval to written transfers of 
land in 1536. 1 As guidance, courts eventually established the determina-
tion of the intent of the parties as their primary goal. 2 Yet, the English 
and American courts also embraced a number of other rules, many of 
which admittedly worked to disregard the actual intent of the parties. 3 
One example is the rule that the language in the granting clause prevails 
when it conflicts with other provisions.4 
In Texas, this rule was given preeminent status in deed construction 
inA/ford v. Krum. 5 InA/ford, a multiclause deed6 was construed as pass-
ing the interest expressed in the granting clause when there were irrecon-
cilable conflicts with other clauses in the document. 7 Recently, much to 
1. 7 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 387-88 (1926). Before the 
Statute of Uses was passed, the law courts required a ceremony before corporeal interests in 
land would pass to the grantee. The ceremony was known as feeoffment with livery of seisin. 
THOMAS BERGIN & PAUL HASKELL, PREFACE TO EsTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTER-
ESTS 11 (2d ed. 1984). See generally John C. Payne, The English Theory of Conveyancing Prior 
to the Land Registration Acts, 7 ALA. L. REV. 227, 238-43 (1955). 
The passage of other statutes worked in conjunction with the Statute of Uses which in-
sured that deeds would wholly supplant the ceremony as a means of conveying land. Statute 
of Enrollments, 1536, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 16 (Eng.); Statute of Frauds, 1676, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3 (Eng.). 
See generally ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.1 , at 712 
(1984). 
2. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 394. See also discussion infra part II. 
3. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 393-94. The Rule in Shelley's Case is perhaps the 
most notorious example. See infra note 17. 
4. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 389-90; see, e.g., Hornet's Nest Girl Scout Coun-
cil Inc. v. Cannon Found., Inc., 339 S.E.2d 26, 31 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)(noting the rule is one 
which frustrates intent). This rule is also known as the "repugnant to the grant rule." See 
generally Tevis Herd, Deed Construction and the "Repugnant to the Grant" Doctrine, 21 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 635 (1990) (discussing and criticizing use of rule). 
5. 671 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. 1984), overruled by Lucke! v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 
1991). 
6. The term "multiclause deed" will be used to refer to deeds with several provisions, in 
addition to the granting clause, describing the interests conveyed. These additional provisions 
include the "subject-to" clause and the "future-lease" clause. See generally, RICHARD W. 
HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS§ 9.1 , at 593-94 (3d ed. 1991). A deed form with a 
granting clause, subject-to and future-lease clause has also been called a three-grant deed. See 
Herd, supra note 4, at 637. That label is avoided herein because it improperly suggests that the 
use of that deed form indicates an intention to make several conveyances in one instrument. 
Instead, the history behind the development of this deed form reveals that it came into use to 
insure that royalties and rentals passed proportionately with a single conveyance of a fractional 
mineral interest. See infra part II. 
7. 671 S.W.2d at 873. 
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the delight of practicing attorneys, Alford was expressly overruled in 
Lucke/ v. White. 8 In that case, the Texas Supreme Court appears to have 
reinstated ascertaining the intent of the parties from the four comers of 
the document as the primary postulate in deed construction.9 Unfortu-
nately, however, Lucke/ and Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 10 may also signal 
the rebirth of another theory of construction which had a dubious pres-
ence in Texas case law prior to Alford: the two-grant doctrine. Under 
this theory of construction, a multiclause deed is construed as making 
separate grants of different types of interests in a particular tract of prop-
erty or varying sizes of one interest at different times. 11 
The purpose of this article is to explore the ramifications of the hold-
ings in Lucke/ and Jupiter Oil and to expose the inappropriateness of 
resurrecting the two-grant doctrine. Part I will review rules of construc-
tion in general and their use in Texas mineral and royalty conveyances in 
particular. Part II will focus on the evolution of the two-grant doctrine 
until its implicit demise in Alford. The doctrine is revealed as the unfor-
tunate progeny of two aberrations in oil and gas jurisprudence. The first 
is an overruled case which spawned the use of the multiclause deed form 
used in Alford and Lucke/. 12 The second is the "estate misconception," 
which is the pervasive confusion about the estates owned by mineral 
owners and their lessees. 13 
Part III will analyze Lucke/ v. White and Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow. 
The former opinion approves the approach of a pre-Alford supreme court 
case, Garrett v. Dils Co. 14 In Garrett, the Texas court harmonized con-
flicting fractions in light of language in the entire deed and by taking 
judicial notice of the fact that the royalty in most mineral deeds is one-
eighth. However, whether Garrett can be hailed as replacing Alford is 
not clear. In Lucke/, the court slipped in and out of two-grant syntax, 
and in Jupiter Oil it overtly applied that doctrine in an opinion that mis-
uses authority and functions under the estate misconception. 15 To com-
pound the confusion, the concurring opinions in both cases urged the 
adoption of the dissent in Alford, but that opinion erroneously viewed 
Garrett as a two-grant case. 16 
8. 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991). 
9. /d. at 461. 
10. 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991). 
11. See infra part II (discussing the two facets of the two-grant doctrine). 
12. The case is Caruthers v. Leonard, 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, judgrn't 
adopted), which is discussed fully in part II. 
13. The "estate misconception" is explained fully in part II. 
14. 159 Tex. 91, 299 S.W.2d 904 (1957). Garrett is discussed at length in part II. 
15. See infra part II. 
16. See infra part II (explaining that Garrett did not use the two-grant doctrine). 
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Part IV will argue that the two-grant theory is not a viable rule of 
construction under case law or the policy embraced in Lucke/ of effectu-
ating the intent of the parties by harmonizing conflicting fractions from 
the four corners of the deed. Instead, Lucke/ should be interpreted as a 
reaffirmation of the Garrett v. Dils Co. approach and Jupiter Oil should 
be discounted due to its faulty exegesis. To further promote title cer-
tainty, the Texas Supreme Court should define the contours of the Gar-
rett approach by formulating fact-specific rules of construction in light of 
the tainted origin of the multiclause deed and the pervasive misconcep-
tions among drafters and courts about the estates owned by mineral own-
ers and lessees. Adopting the Garrett approach would comply with the 
malleable rules for document interpretation and would promote title 
certainty more effectively than other methods of construction, such as 
determining that all deeds with conflicting provisions are ambiguous. 
Moreover, unlike the two-grant doctrine, it will also preserve the sanctity 
of the parties' intent. 
II. DEED CONSTRUCTION 
A. In General 
Once the written document supplanted the ceremony as a means of 
conveying real property in England, the need for rules to interpret these 
documents arose. By the seventeenth century, a lengthy list of rules had 
been compiled by the common-law courts. Included on this list were the 
following rules: 
1) of two repugnant clauses in a deed the first should prevail; .... 
2) words shall be construed according to the intent of the parties; 
3) every part of the deed ought to be compared with the other and 
one entire sense ought to be made thereof . . . . 
4) in the common law the grant of every common person is taken 
most strongly against himself and most favourably towards the 
grantee; ... 
5) extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, alter, or contra-
dict the terms of a deed . . . Y 
17. HOLDSWORTH, supra note I, at 389-92 (citations omitted) (numbers added). At com-
mon law the rules regarding use of extrinsic evidence for interpretation were refined by Lord 
Bacon who determined that no extrinsic evidence of any kind was admissible to remedy a 
patent ambiguity, but evidence of intention was permisssible to solve a latent ambiguity. /d. at 
392. The patent/latent distinction is not used by most courts today in determining the use of 
extrinsic evidence in interpretation of documents. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, § 11.1, at 
717-18 (noting most courts freely admit testimony that will help resolve the ambiguity without 
bothering to classify it as latent or patent). 
This list includes both rules of construction and rules of law. The difference is that rules 
of construction are applied if intended, while rules of law are applied to a certain set of facts 
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This list is not exhaustive, but only representative of the laundry list ap-
proach that the courts developed. As the number of rules on this list 
grew, it was clear, even to the judges themselves, that the real intent of 
the parties was often disregarded. 18 
In the United States, the rules developed at common law are still 
used today in construing deeds, wills, and contracts. 19 However, regard-
less of the document involved, ascertaining the intent of the parties has 
become the "polestar" of construction. 20 Therefore, rules which tend 
to frustrate rather than elucidate the intent of the parties have been 
wholly abrogated, or at least subordinated, by both statutes and judicial 
decisions. 21 
B. Document Construction in Texas 
1. In General 
Whether the document at issue is a contract, deed, or will, Texas 
courts have consistently proclaimed that the primary goal is to ascertain 
regardless of the true intent of the parties. CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO 
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, ch. 6, § 2, at 144 (3d ed. 1988). One of the most notorious 
rules of law developed at common law is the Rule in Shelley's Case. /d. 
18. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 393-94. 
19. See, e.g., State Sec. Ins. Co. v. Burgos, 583 N.E.2d 547, 554 (Ill. 1991) (construing 
insurance contract against drafter); Thomas v. Steuernol, 460 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1991) (construing deeds to pass greatest estate); Verzeano v. Carpenter, 815 P.2d 1275, 
1278 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (citing general rule that an ambiquity in a deed is construed against 
the grantor, but noting an exception for reservation of an easement); Hornet's Nest Girl Scout 
Council, Inc. v. Cannon Found. Inc. , 339 S.E.2d 26, 31 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (applying repug-
nancy rule reluctantly). 
20. See Galford v. Kirby, 512 So. 2d 1356, 1360 (Ala. 1987) (calling the grantor's intent 
the "polestar that guides us"). See also 6A RICHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY, § 899[3], at 108 (Patrick J. Rohan et a!. eds., 1988). 
21. See, e.g., Lucke! v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 464 (Tex. 1991) (rejecting rule that grant-
ing clause prevails when it conflicts with other provisions in favor of four-corners approach); 
Hornet's Nest Girl Scout Council, Inc., v. Cannon Found., Inc., 339 S.E.2d 26, 31 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1986) (reluctantly following rule that granting clause prevails when repugnant to other 
clauses, but recognizing it as "an inflexible rule of property which arbitrarily prefers certain 
formal parts of the deed over the plainly expressed intent of the grantor"). See PowELL, 
supra note 20, § 901[1], at 154 (repugnancy doctrine generally renounced). This change ap-
plies to both rules of law and rules of construction. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.001 
(Vernon 1984) (words required at common law to transfer fee no longer necessary); N.Y. 
REAL PROPERTY LAw § 240 (McKinney 1992) (construing instruments of conveyance ac-
cording to intent of parties); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 706.10 (West 1991) (passing all of an estate 
unless a different intent is expressed or implicated). The most notorious rule of law that 
crossed the Atlantic from England is probably the Rule in Shelley's Case. That rule has been 
virtually abolished in the United States. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.49 (Baldwin 
1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551.8 (1974); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-9 (1973); See also, 
BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 1, at 97. The rule tended to frustrate the grantor's intent 
because words were given an unintended meaning. The rule had been formulated during the 
era of feudalism but had survived as a rule of property. /d. at 94. 
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the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument. 22 This 
rule of construction is modified, however, by the caveat that it is not the 
intent that the parties meant but failed to express, but the intention that 
is expressed. 23 If the document fails to reflect the parties' true intent due 
to mutual mistake, the remedy is reformation, not construction. 24 
When the court's task is construction, Texas follows the general rule 
that intent is to be gathered from the four comers of the document.25 
The four-comers rule requires that the parties' intention be gathered 
from the instrument as a whole and not from isolated parts.26 Extrinsic 
evidence is not admissible unless the document is ambiguous. 27 When an 
ambiguity exists, a summary judgment is not proper. 28 
In Texas, as in all jurisdictions, courts have articulated a consistent 
litany of rules for determining whether an ambiguity exists. First, the 
22. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983) (construing a contract); McMahon 
v. Christmann, 157 Tex. 403, 407, 303 S.W.2d 341, 344 (1957) (interpreting an oil and gas 
lease); Harris v. Windsor, 156 Tex. 324, 328, 294 S.W.2d 798, 800 (1956) (construing a deed); 
Perfect Union Lodge No. 10 v. Interfirst Bank, 748 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. 1988) (construing a 
will). 
23. Prairie Producing Co. v. Schlachter, 786 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 
1990, writ denied); Harlan v. Vetter, 732 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987, writ 
ref'd n.r.e.). 
24. Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 741 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. 1987). 
The underlying objective of reformation is to correct a mutual mistake made in pre-
paring a written instrument, so that the instrument truly reflects the original agree-
ment of the parties . . . . By implication, then, reformation requires two elements: 
(I) an original agreement and (2) a mutual mistake, made after the original agree-
ment, in reducing the original agreement to writing. 
Id. at 379 (emphasis added). 
25 . See, e.g., Henderson v. Parker, 728 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tex. 1987) (will construction); 
City of Midland v. Waller, 430 S.W.2d 473, 478 (Tex. 1968) (contract construction); Ulbricht 
v. Friedsam, 159 Tex. 607, 613, 325 S.W.2d 669, 673 (1959) (deed construction). 
26. See, e.g ., Mayfield v. de Benavides, 693 S.W.2d 500, 503 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Shown v. Getty Oil Co., 645 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Tex. App.-San 
Antonio 1982, writ ref'd). See also Republic Nat'l Bank v. Fredericks, !55 Tex. 79, 83, 283 
S.W.2d 39, 43 (1955) (stating that the entire instrument should be considered). 
27. Stauffer v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 858, 863 (Tex. 1990); Cherokee Water Co. v. 
Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. 1982) (considering whether extrinsic evidence is im-
proper when the terms are unambiguous); see generally, HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 3.2, at 
120 (3d ed. 1991). See CUNNINGHAM, supra note I, at 717-18 (observing that most courts 
today freely admit extrinsic evidence without the patent/latent distinction). 
Texas courts generally do not use the latent/patent distinction, discussed supra note 18, 
for determining whether extrinsic evidence is admissible in deed interpretation. See Neece v. 
AAA Realty Co., 159 Tex. 403, 407, 322 S.W.2d 597, 600 n.3 (1959) ("The Baconian distinc-
tion between patent and latent ambiguities should be disregarded by the Texas courts.") (citing 
2 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK & RoY R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE CIVIL AND CRIMI-
NAL§ 1683 (Texas Practice 3d ed. 1980)). 
28. Reilly v. Rangers Management, Inc. 727 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Tex. 1987) (contract 
construction). 
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question of ambiguity is a question of law for the court.29 The Texas 
Supreme Court has stated that this determination is made "by looking at 
the contract as a whole in light of the circumstances existing at the time 
the contract was entered into."30 This statement does not permit consid-
eration of extraneous evidence to determine the ambiguity question; in-
stead, it directs how language in the document should be interpreted. 31 
If in light of surrounding circumstances the language appears to be capa-
ble of only a single meaning, the court will be confined to the writing. 32 
If the language can be interpreted in different manners, rules of construc-
tion are used. An instrument is ambiguous only when the application of 
these rules leaves it unclear which meaning is the correct one. 33 If the 
instrument can be harmonized, however, it is not ambiguous.34 
The process of interpretation or construction, including the determi-
nation of ambiguity and the use of extrinsic evidence, is presented as 
beguilingly precise, but scholars admit "the rules are complex, technical, 
and difficult to apply."35 The process also frequently frustrates the 
29. Id. 
30. Id. See also Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Floyd, 518 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (construing the language of a release in light of 
circumstances surrounding its execution). Extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances is 
admissible to assist the court in determining the sense in which words were used. Kelley v. 
Marlin, 714 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. 1986); Kelly v. Womack, 153 Tex. 371, 377, 268 S.W.2d 
903, 906 (1954) (stating that deference to intent is a cardinal principle and courts determine 
intent from the language in conveyance, in light of the circumstances of its formulation). 
31. See Reilly v. Rangers Management, Inc. 727 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Tex. 1987) (stating 
that existence of an ambiguity is a question of law, not a question of fact) . 
32. Watkins v. Petro-Search, Inc., 689 F.2d 537, 538 (5th Cir. 1982). See also Kelley v. 
Marlin, 714 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. 1986) ("Since the parties agree that (the will] is unambigu-
ous, parol evidence of what the testator intended is inadmissible. However, extrinsic evidence 
of surrounding circumstances is admissible to ascertain the meaning of words used in the 
will.") (citations omitted). Parol evidence will not be received except to explain an ambiguity. 
Lewis v. East Texas Fin. Co., 136 Tex. 149, 154, 146 S.W.2d 977, 980 (1941); Lincoln Liberty 
Life Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 535 S.W.2d 7, 11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) 
(interpreting an insurance policy). 
33. Prairie Producing Co. v. Schlachter, 786 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 
1990, writ denied). 
34. ld. See also Lucke! v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459,462 (Tex. 1991). The Texas cases have 
not articulated the rules as a three-tiered process but the approach is similar to that set forth in 
a Mississippi Supreme Court case which described the three-tiers as: 1) "the court will attempt 
to ascertain intent by examining the language contained within the 'four corners' of the instru-
ment in dispute;" 2) the use of applicable canons of contract construction; and 3) consideration 
of extrinsic or parol evidence. Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 349,351-53 (Miss. 
1990). This process does not require that a court follow all three steps. Rather, subsequent 
steps are taken only if intent remains unclear. I d. 
35. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 3-16, 
at 177 (3d ed. 1987). The authors also opine that: 
There is no unanimity as to the content of the parol evidence rule or the process 
called interpretation . ... It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that the courts 
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judges making the determination. For example, one Texas Supreme 
Court Justice commented that, "I find it odd that all parties to this dis-
pute, the trial court, the court of appeals, and this court agree that the 
contract in question is clear as a bell and yet disagree as to its mean-
ing."36 This is also evident in appellate cases that reverse the lower 
courts' determinations of ambiguity37 and in inconsistent opinions about 
how conflicting provisions should be harmonized. 38 Construction by 
courts is also frequently constrained by the parties' failure to plead ambi-
guity, insisting, instead, that their opposing interpretations are unam-
biguously expressed. 39 
A preferable alternative to struggling with the amorphous nature of 
the rules recited in the interpretation process is to adopt fact-specific 
rules for construction of particular problems. This alternative has been 
used by the Texas Supreme Court in construing specific problems en-
countered in mineral and royalty conveyances.40 As argued in Part IV, 
intent and title certainty could both be preserved if specific rules are also 
/d. 
follow any of these rules blindly, literally or consistently. As often as not they choose 
the standard or the rule that they think will give rise to a just result in the particular 
case. We have also seen that often under a guise of interpretation a court will actu-
ally enforce its notions of "public policy" which is "nothing more than an attempt to 
do justice." 
36. Criswell v. European Crossroads Shopping Ctr., Ltd., 792 S.W.2d 945, 950 (Tex. 
1990) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). An appellate court justice expressed a similar concern in 
1933: 
To my mind, no more ambiguous instrument has ever been presented to me for con-
struction .... Courts are concerned primarily with arriving at the intention of the 
parties, and a slight variation from a clear expression in an instrument is sufficient to 
create an ambiguity authorizing admission of oral testimony to determine the intent. 
Jones v. Bedford, 56 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1933, writ ref'd) (Hickman, 
C.J., dissenting): 
37. See, e.g., Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 395, 185 S.W.2d 563, 564 (1945) (deter-
mining document was not ambiguous and reversing lower court's finding of ambiguity); Tipps 
v. Bodine, 101 S.W.2d 1076, 1079 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936, writ ref'd) (trial court 
used remedy of reformation; appellate court affirms but on basis that deed is unambiguous). 
38. See, e.g., Lucke! v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 464 (Tex. 1991) (stating that the Alford 
opinion fails to correctly harmonize the deed provisions); Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 64, 273 
S.W.2d 617, 620-21 (1955) (appellate decision fails to correctly harmonize deed provisions). 
39. McMahon v. Christmann, 303 S.W.2d 341, 343 (1957) (interpreting an oil and gas 
lease) ("As is often true in litigation involving the interpretation and construction of writtten 
instruments both parties insist that the instrument is 'plain and unambiguous' and admits of no 
reasonable meaning other than that for which they contend."). See also Garrett v. Dils Co., 
157 Tex. 92, 94, 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (1957) (neither party claimed deed was ambiguous). 
40. See, e.g., Averyt v. Grande, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 891, 895 (Tex. 1986) (adopting rule that 
if deed reserves fraction of minerals under land "described" rather than "conveyed," it 
reserves fraction of minerals under entire physical tract, regardless of part of mineral estate 
actually conveyed); Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) 
(adopting ordinary and natural meaning test for construction of "other minerals" clauses). 
1993] Two-GRANT DOCTRINE 81 
adopted for determining the quantum of interest conveyed in a mul-
ticlause mineral or royalty deed. 
2. Construction of Mineral and Royalty Deeds 
The rules for construing deeds are basically the same as those for 
construing other documents. The only distinguishing factor is the prefer-
ence for rules that promote title certainty in order to facilitate the trans-
fer of property rights.41 For example, in Moser v. United States Steel 
Corp. , 42 the Texas Supreme Court rejected the surface destruction test in 
favor of the ordinary and natural meaning test in construing "other min-
erals" clauses to promote the stability of land titles by avoiding the neces-
sity of litigation to determine various fact issues.43 In Altman v. Blake,44 
the Texas court again stressed the significance of promoting title cer-
tainty in adopting guidelines for determining whether a deed conveyed a 
mineral or a royalty interest. 45 
In construing mineral and royalty conveyances, Texas courts follow 
the general rule that ascertaining intent from the entire deed is the pri-
41. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§§ 3.1, 3.10, at 30, 67-69 
(3rd ed. 1986). 
[The] legal protection of property rights creates incentives to use resources efficiently . 
. . . In order to facilitate the transfer of resources from less to more valuable uses, 
property rights, in principle, should be freely transferable .... Efficiency requires that 
property rights be transferable; but if many people have a claim on each piece of 
property, transfers will be difficult to manage .... Problems in transferring property 
rights are part of a larger problem, that of deciding who owns what property. 
/d. Concerning problems in the interpretation of oil and gas leases, see, e.g. , Stephen F. Wil-
liams, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases: Some General Principles, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 
153, 153 (1981) (arguing that formulas generally used to interpret lessor's duties under oil and 
gas leases are vague and circular). Clarifying the rules for interpeting mineral deeds will pro-
duce lower transaction costs. See Joseph T. Janczyk, An Economic Analysis of the Land Title 
Systems for Transferring Real Property, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 213, 213 (1977) (asserting that compli-
cated property rights raise transaction costs of transferring property). 
42. 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984). 
43. /d. at 101; Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex. 1986) (recognizing the neces-
sity for stability and certainty in construction of mineral conveyances). Dean Eugene Kuntz 
has noted, "In matters of land titles, and most certainly in the field of oil and gas where heavy 
expenditures of capital are incident to exploration, development and production, certainty is of 
the utmost importance." Eugene Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 
WYO. L.J. 107, 114 (1949). It is debatable whether the Moser opinion in fact achieved its goal. 
See Laura H. Burney, "Oil, Gas, and Other Minerals" Clauses in Texas: Who's on First?, 41 
Sw. L.J. 695 (1987). 
44. 712 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1986). 
45. /d. at 120. The issue in Altman was whether a deed could be construed as a mineral 
conveyance, rather than a royalty, when the grantee did not receive all the attributes of the 
mineral estate, specifically the right to lease and the right to receive rentals. /d. at 117. The 
court held that this did not prevent the deed from being construed as a mineral conveyance. 
/d. at 120. 
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mary goal. 46 In this endeavor, many of the rules developed at common 
law are used. For example, many cases, including one that is significant 
for the purposes of this article, Garrett v. Dils Co.,47 have invoked the 
rule that a document should be construed against the grantor to convey 
the greatest estate possible.48 In Lott v. Lott,49 this rule was cited in con-
junction with the rule that "the granting clause prevails over other provi-
sions of a deed."50 
In addition to using common law rules, Texas has also fashioned its 
own rules for the construction of mineral or royalty deeds. The Moser 
and Altman cases noted above are two instances in which the Texas 
Supreme Court has clarified rules for construing specific problems en-
countered in mineral and royalty deeds. A more notorious example of a 
Texas creation is the Duhig doctrine. 51 The two-grant doctrine, which is 
analyzed in Part II, is another.52 The two-grant doctrine has two facets. 
46. See Harris v. Windsor, 294 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. 1956) ("[T]he intention of the 
parties, when it can be ascertained from a consideration of all parts of the instrument, will be 
given effect when possible."). Even Alford v. Krum, recognized that "the court must attempt 
to harmonize all parts of a deed, since the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have 
some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement." 671 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. 
1984). 
47. 157 Tex. 92, 95, 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (1957). 
48. See, e.g., Garrett v. Oils Co., 157 Tex. 92, 95, 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (1957) (construing 
deed against grantor); Lott v. Lott 370 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex. 1963) (construing deed to con· 
vey greatest estate possible); Waters v. Ellis, 158 Tex. 342, 347, 312 S.W.2d 231, 234 (1958) 
(construing deed to convey greatest estate possible); Candlelight Hills Civic Ass'n Inc. v. 
Goodwin, 763 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]1989, writ denied) (constru· 
ing deed to convey greatest estate to grantee); Brown v. Davila, 807 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tex. 
App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (construing document against grantor); Hoffman v. Mag-
nolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828, 829 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, holding approved) (con· 
struing deed to grant greatest estate to grantee); Humble Oil Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 
205 S.W.2d 355, 360 (1947) (construing ambiguous language against grantee); Davis v. Huey, 
620 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1981) (construing document against the grantor). See also Temple-
Eastex Inc. v. Addison Bank, 672 S.W.2d 793, 798 (Tex. 1984) (construing writing against 
author); Republic Nat') Bank v. Northwest Nat') Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 115 (Tex. 1979) (con-
struing contract against author and construing to give validity). 
49. 370 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1963). 
50. Id. at 465 (citing Waters v. Ellis, 158 Tex. 342, 347, 312 S.W.2d 231, 234 (1958)). 
Both Lott and Ellis were relied upon by the Texas Supreme Court in Alford v. Krum, 671 
S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. 1984). Tevis Herd has demonstrated that these cases do not justify the 
holding in Alford. See Herd, supra note 4, at 648-49 (Lott and Ellis based on validation doc-
trine not repugnant-to-the-grant rule). 
51. See Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940). The 
Duhig doctrine provides that where the conveyance represents that the grantor is the owner of 
a particular interest in property and such interest is conveyed by the deed, the grantor is 
estopped by his convenant of general warranty to claim that the deed conveyed a less estate 
than the grantor's ownership. Duhig, 135 Tex. at 507, 144 S.W.2d at 880. See generally HEM-
INGWAY, supra note 6, § 3.2, at 129. 
52. See Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, 
holding approved). In discussing the two-grant doctrine, Professor Smith notes that Texas has 
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Under the first, deeds have been construed as conveying two different 
interests in one tract of land, for example, one interest in the land and 
another in royalties due under an existing lease. 53 Under the second 
facet, a deed is construed as conveying one interest in two different sizes 
at different times.54 In 1984, in Alford v. Krum, 55 the Texas Supreme 
Court implicitly rejected the second facet in favor of the rule that the 
granting clause prevails when there are conflicts with other clauses. 56 
3. The Rise and Fall of Alford v. Krum 
Prior to 1984, the Texas court had continually embraced principles 
for construction of mineral and royalty conveyances that are antithetical 
to preferring one clause in a document. For example, in 1957, the Texas 
Supreme Court made the following commentary on the use of common 
law rules in deed construction: 
We have long since relaxed the strictness of the ancient rules for 
the construction of deeds, and have established the rule for the 
construction of deeds as for the construction of all contracts,-that 
the intention of the parties, when it can be ascertained from a con-
sideration of all parts of the instrument, will be given effect when 
possible. That the intention, when ascertained, prevails over arbi-
trary rules. 57 
The Texas court also repeatedly required an attempt to harmonize 
all parts of a deed, because "the parties to an instrument intend every 
clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agree-
ment . . .. " 58 
In spite of the foregoing pronouncements by the Texas Supreme 
Court, in 1984 the court gave one arbitrary rule preeminent status in 
"given birth to far more than its fair share of unfortunate oil and gas conveyancing doctrines." 
Ernest E. Smith, The "Subject To" Clause, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 15-1, § 15.02[1] 
(1985). It is the purpose of this article to suggest that the two-grant doctrine is another "un-
fortunate" doctrine that should be denounced. 
53. See Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, 
holding approved); Wood v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 273 S.W.2d 617 (1954) (construing deed as 
conveying two different interests in one tract of land). See infra part II for a thorough discus-
sion of both facets of the two-grant doctrine. 
54. See Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991). See infra part II for a 
thorough discussion of this facet. 
55. 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984). 
56. /d. at 873. See infra part II. 
57. Harris v. Windsor, 156 Tex. 324, 328, 294 S.W.2d 798, 800 (1956). 
58. Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 64, 273 S.W.2d 617, 620 (1954); see also Garrett v. Oils 
Co., 157 Tex. 92, 96-97, 299 S.W.2d 904, 907 (1957) (construing the deed as a whole to deter-
mine the intent of the parties); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 224, 205 
S.W.2d 355, 359 (1947) (construing deed as a whole to conclude that an undivided one-half 
interest was conveyed). 
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deed construction. In Alford v. Krum, 59 the court held that "when there 
is an irreconcilable conflict between clauses of a deed, the granting clause 
prevails over all other provisions."60 The deed at issue in Alford was a 
multiclause deed which attempted to convey a fraction of the grantor's 
mineral estate. 61 The granting clause of the deed used the fraction "one-
half of the one-eighth interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other min-
erals."62 Another clause recited that the sale is made subject-to an ex-
isting oil and gas lease but "covers and includes 1/16 of all the oil royalty 
... due and to be paid under the terms of said lease."63 A final clause, 
the future-lease clause, provided that if the existing lease terminated, the 
grantees would own "a one-half interest in all oil, gas and other minerals 
in and upon said land, together with one-half interest in all future 
rents. "64 The supreme court held that an irreconcilable conflict existed 
between the granting clause and the future lease clause that must be re-
solved in favor of "the clear and unambiguous language of the granting 
clause. " 65 
Chief Justice Pope dissented and argued for the adoption of the 
method used in Garrett v. Dils Co. 66 Although most commentators con-
sider Garrett as rejecting or ignoring the two-grant doctrine, 67 Pope in-
terpreted it as using the doctrine and holding that two separate estates 
were granted under the granting clause and the future lease clause. 68 
Alford was soundly criticized by the bench and bar.69 In 1991, the 
Texas Supreme Court expressly overruled it in Lucke/ v. White. 70 The 
59. 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984). 
60. Id. at 872. The majority in the civil appeals decision had also decided the deed was 
unambiguous. See Krum v. Alford, 653 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982), 
rev'd, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984). However, in that opinion it was determined that the deed 
conveyed a 1/16 interest under the existing lease which increased to an undivided 1/2 interest. 
I d. 
61. The history behind the use of this type of deed is explained in part II. 
62. Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 871. 
63. Id. at 872. 
64. Id. at 873. 
65. Id. at 874. See generally, Herd, supra note 4 (criticizing the Alford decision). 
66. Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 876 (Pope, C.J., dissenting). See infra note 128. 
67. See, e.g., HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 9.1, at 593 (stating that court departed from 
two-grant doctrine in Garrett); 2 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND 
GAS LAW§ 340.2, at 242-43 (1991) (Garrett ignored two-grant theory); Herd, supra note 4, at 
654 (viewing Garrett as using the four-comers rule). 
68. Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 876 (Pope, C.J. , dissenting). Chief Justice Pope viewed the 
future lease clause as "the ridgepole that divides the rights conveyed before reverter from those 
conveyed after the reversion." Id. at 874. 
69. See Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 802 S.W.2d 354, 358 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990), rev'd, 
819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991) (suggesting that the supreme court reconsider Alford). See also, 
Herd, supra note 4 (criticizing the repugnant to the grant rule and A/ford). 
70. 819 S.W.2d 459, 464 (Tex. 1991). 
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deed in Lucke/ was similar to that in Alford since different fractions were 
used in separate clauses of the conveyance.71 The court held that "the 
majority in Alford incorrectly failed to harmonize the provisions under 
the four corners rule and then erred in applying the 'repugnant to the 
grant' rule in disregard of the future lease clause.'m Although the frac-
tion 1/32 was used in the granting clause and 1/4 in the future lease 
clause, the court held the deed was "properly harmonized to mean that 
the interest conveyed was one-fourth of the royalties reserved under the 
existing and all future leases. " 73 
In Lucke/, the fraction in the granting clause was not accepted as 
written but interpreted in light of the other clauses. This would indicate 
that the two-grant doctrine was not used. However, the concurring and 
dissenting opinions in Lucke/ seem to disagree about whether the major-
ity used the doctrine. The concurrence felt compelled to urge the express 
adoption of Pope's dissent in Alford, 74 while the dissent criticized the 
majority for finding two grants.75 
In a case decided the same day, Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow/6 which also 
involved the use of different fractions in separate deed clauses, the court 
held that Luckel's holding regarding Alford did not apply because the 
deed unambiguously conveyed one interest under an existing lease that 
expanded into a larger interest at its termination. 77 This differs from the 
holding in Lucke/ since the fraction in the granting clause was enforced 
as written. No attempt was made to harmonize it in light of the fractions 
used in other clauses. 
After Lucke/ and Jupiter, it is clear that the rule that the granting 
clause prevails is no longer the litmus test for intent in deed construction. 
The question remains, however, whether, in the construction of mineral 
or royalty conveyances with conflicting fractions in separate clauses, the 
court has adopted a liberal four corners approach requiring harmonizing 
the fractions, or the blanket use of the two-grant doctrine, which would 
enforce the conflicting fractions as written. To answer this query, the 
evolution of the two-grant doctrine will be reviewed and the decisions in 
Lucke/ and Jupiter will be closely analyzed. 
71. Lucke/ was different in that it was clearly a royalty deed and Alford involved a min-
eral deed. The Lucke/ court determined that this difference would not affect the rules of con-
struction used. ld. at 463-64. 
72. Id. at 464. 
73. Id. at 465. The court also held that the grantee was not to receive less than 1/32 of 
production, which was one-fourth of the usual one-eighth royalty. 
74. ld. at 465 (Mauzy, J., concurring). 
75. Id. at 466 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting). 
76. 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991). 
77. Id. at 467 & n. l, 469. 
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Ill. THE Two-GRANT DOCTRINE 
A. Background 
1. The Multiclause Deed 
It is evident from the review in Part I that the controversial convey-
ances involve documents with two or three main divisions: 1) the grant-
ing clause, which is similar to clauses in other real property conveyances; 
2) the subject-to clause, which informs that the conveyance is made sub-
ject to an existing lease and covers and includes the benefits of that lease; 
and 3) the future-lease clause, which provides for ownership rights after 
the existing lease expires.78 This form is referred to as a three-grant 
deed. 79 That label is a misnomer, however, because it assumes that mul-
tiple conveyances are intended. Instead, this deed form was developed to 
clearly express the intent to make a single conveyance of a fractional 
mineral interest and the rights appurtenant thereto. 
The three-grant or multiclause deed was created in response to an 
early Texas case, Caruthers v. Leonard, 80 which held that when a grantee 
received an interest in a mineral estate that was already under lease, only 
a reversionary interest passed-not the delay rentals, and presumably, 
not the royalties. 81 This suggests that economic benefits would only pass 
if expressly assigned. Thus, the three-grant deed came into vogue, not to 
provide parties with a mode for making separate conveyances in one 
deed, but to insure that a single grant of a fractional mineral interest 
included a proportionate interest in benefits under existing and future 
leases. 82 
Leonard has been overruled.83 Texas now recognizes the prevailing 
view that a fractional conveyance of the mineral estate carries with it, as 
appurtenances, a like fraction of the economic benefits of the mineral 
estate. 84 These benefits include the right to receive royalties, bonus pay-
ments, and delay rentals, as well as the right to lease, or the executive 
right. 85 Therefore, a grantor wishing to convey a 1/2 mineral interest 
78. See HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 9.1, at 593-94 (3d ed. 1991). Professor Smith has 
explained that the prime function of the subject-to clause is to protect the grantor against a 
breach of warranty claim when the property he is conveying is already leased. Smith, supra 
note 51 , §§ 15.01, 15.2. 
79. Herd, supra note 4, at 637. 
80. 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, judgm't adopted). 
81. /d. at 782. See also Smith, supra note 52, § 15.02, (arguing royalties are apparently 
not payable under the lease). 
82. See Smith, supra note 52, § 15.02[2] . 
83. Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 302 (1943). 
84. Day Co. v. Texland Petroleum, 786 S.W.2d 667, 669 n.1 (Tex. 1990). 
85. /d. See generally HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 9.1, at 592. 
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and a like interest in the appurtenant rights can do so by simply convey-
ing a 1/2 mineral interest, regardless of an existing lease. This will be 
sufficient to entitle the grantee to 1/2 of the benefits under the existing 
and future leases. 
Forms used today reflect this understanding and provide space for 
only one fraction. 86 Unfortunately, the legacy of Caruthers v. Leonard 
has been the extensive use of multiclause or three-grant deeds, which 
require the parties to fill in a fraction in three different clauses. Since 
drafters and the judiciary frequently misconstrue the estates created by 
an oil and gas lease, this seemingly perfunctory task has resulted in con-
flicting fractions that have plagued the courts in deed construction cases. 
2. The Estate Misconception 
Shortly after the discovery of oil and gas in commercial quantities at 
the turn of the century, courts were faced with numerous questions for 
which the common law provided few direct answers. The conceptual 
grappling with the economic benefits of the mineral estate in Caruthers v. 
Leonard is one example. 87 Another issue that immediately perplexed the 
courts concerned the estates created in the lessor and the lessee by an oil 
and gas lease. 88 In Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 89 the 
Texas Supreme Court determined that an oil and gas lease creates a fee 
simple determinable in the lessee in the mineral estate. 90 The lessee owns 
this fee in the entire mineral estate. The lessor retains the future interest 
that accompanies a fee simple determinable, a possibility of reverter, in 
86. 6 WEST's TEXAS FORMS§ 1.3, at 28 (2d ed. 1991). The multiclause deed form is also 
still used. See id. § 1.4, at 30-31. 
87. Caruthers v. Leonard, 254 S.W. 779, 782 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, judgm't 
adopted). See also Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 568 (Tex. 1962) (rejecting 
application of common-law trespass rules in determining if trespass occurred in secondary 
recovery project); Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 629, 101 S.W.2d 543, 544 (1937) (question-
ing whether royalty owner was entitled to bonus and delay rental payments); Hager v. Stakes, 
116 Tex. 453, 471 , 294 S.W. 835, 840 (1927) (comparing royalties to rents and determining 
that royalties are real property for taxation purposes); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Kishi, 276 
S.W. 190, 191 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, judgm't adopted) (fashioning remedy for damage to 
leasing value where common-law remedies proved inadequate). The struggle with oil and gas 
estate concepts continues. See Day & Co. v. Texland Petroleum, 786 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. 
1990) (determining that the executive right is realty, reversing earlier cases treating it as 
personalty). 
88. See Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 
(1923). See generally A. W. Walker Jr., Fee Simple Ownership of Oil and Gas, 6 TEX. L. REv. 
125, 126-28 (1928); A. W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil 
and Gas Lease in Texas, 7 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1928). 
89. 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923). 
90. /d. at 295. This is the estate created when an "unless" lease, rather than an "or" 
lease is used. See generally HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 6.2, at 285-86. 
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the whole estate.91 Pursuant to the lease terms, the lessor also has a right 
to royalties, delay rentals, and other economic benefits and is permitted 
to explore for oil and gas and retain a portion of production. During the 
lease, the lessee has the right to develop all of the oil and gas. When the 
lease expires, the lessor regains possessory rights in the entire mineral 
estate due to the possibility of reverter. 92 
Since most leases provide for a 1/8 royalty, however, drafters and 
courts perceived the estate to be a fee simple determinable in only 7/8 in 
the lessee, with the lessor retaining a 1!8 fee interest.93 This misconcep-
tion stems from a failure to distinguish between the mineral estate 
owner's right to receive royalties and the value placed on that right in the 
lease. Although the lessor only retains a 1/8 royalty interest, the lessor 
still has a possibility of reverter in the entire mineral estate. Similarly, 
91. BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 1, at 58. Bergin and Haskell describe the possibility 
of reverter as follows: "A possibility of reverter is the future interest a transferor keeps when 
he transfers an estate whose maximum potential duration equals that of the estate he had to 
start with and attaches a special limitation that operates in his own favor." ld. Applying this 
concept to an oil and gas lease, the lessor has conveyed the "estate he had to start with" (a fee 
simple estate in the minerals) but has attached a limitation, the production of oil and gas in 
paying quantities. When that condition is breached, the lessor will again have unencumbered 
rights in the whole mineral estate. 
92. See Stephens County, 113 Tex. at 173, 254 S.W. at 295 ("The instruments . . . passed 
to appellee determinable fees in the lands; leaving in the grantors, their heirs or assigns, the 
possibility of reacquiring the absolute fee-simple titles, less whatever minerals may be 
meantime produced and marketed."). 
93. See Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991); McBride v. Hutson, 
157 Tex. 632, 637, 306 S.W.2d 888, 891 (1957). In McBride, the issue was whether a convey-
ance by the grantor of a 1(3 interest in minerals that were under lease was a grant of 1/3 of 
7/ 8 or 1/3 of 8/ 8 of the grantor's minerals. The court relied on Stephens and held that the 
grant was 1/3 of 7/8 since the grantor's reversion was only in 7/8, not 8/8 of the minerals. I d. 
In Tipps v. Bodine, the appellate court assumed that the fraction 1/16 is proper to convey 1/2 
of the minerals when that estate is under lease. 101 S.W.2d 1076, 1079 (Tex. Civ App.-
Texarkana 1936, writ ref'd). 
Early Texas Supreme Court cases that decided whether royalties should be treated as 
realty or personalty for tax purposes contributed to the misconceptions. See Hager v. Stakes 
116 Tex. 453, 471, 294 S.W. 835, 840 (1927). Hager held that the lease at issue only invested 
the lessee with a 7/ 8 interest because the oil royalty was payable in kind; it distinquished 
Stephens since the lease at issue there provided that the lessee at his option could oay the 
stipulated royalties in oil or cash. ld. at 839. Most leases today give the lessee the option of 
paying royalty in kind or in cash. The prevailing view is that the royalty payment is real 
property, although payable in money, and the oil and gas lease is viewed as placing the entire 
mineral estate in the lessee. See State v. Quintana Petroleum Co., 134 Tex. 179, 186, 133 
S.W.2d 112, 115 (1939); Sheffield v. Hogg, 124 Tex. 290, 297, 77 S.W.2d 1021, 1025 (1934) 
(disapproving of unnecessary dicta in Hager); see generally HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 2.5, 
at 59 n.94, 61. 
Other jurisdictions have emphasized the estate misconception in deed construction. See, 
e.g. , Heyen v. Hartnett, 679 P.2d 1152, 1158 (Kan. 1984). 
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although the lessee only has a right to 7/8 of production after costs, the 
lessee still owns a fee simple determinable in 8/8 of the minerals. 
The estate misconception leads to the use of conflicting fractions in a 
multiclause deed. For example, a lessor who has leased the entire min-
eral estate, but desires to sell-one half of the minerals, would assume that 
he owned 1/8 of the minerals due to the existing lease. Therefore, the 
lessor would use the fraction 1/16, or a double fraction, 1/2 of 1/8, to 
convey 1/2 of what he perceived he owned. In the subject-to clause, he 
would use the fraction 1/2 to insure that the grantee got 1/2 of the 1/8 
royalty provided for in the existing lease. The lessor would also use the 
fraction 1/2 in the future lease clause, since he perceives that when the 
existing lease terminates, his interest then becomes 8/8 rather than 1/8.94 
B. Development of the Two-Grant Doctrine 
The two-grant doctrine, as it has been applied by various Texas 
courts, has two facets. One involves using the theory to hold that two 
different interests, the royalty and the mineral interest, have been con-
veyed in a single deed in a particular tract of land. The second facet 
involves construing a multiclause deed as conveying the same interest, 
either a mineral or royalty interest, in different sizes at different times. 
1. The Hoffman Facet 
Ironically, the case that propagated the two-grant doctrine did not 
involve the use of conflicting fractions or thrive on the estate misconcep-
tion. The three-grant or multiclause deed, however, does provide the for-
mat for development of the doctrine. In Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum 
Co.,95 the grantor, who owned 320 acres that were under lease to an oil 
company, conveyed a one-half interest in the oil, gas, and other minerals 
under a certain 90 of the 320 acres to the grantee. The controversy 
stemmed from the subject-to clause, which provided that "it is under-
stood and agreed that this sale is made subject to said lease, but covers 
and includes one-half of all the oil royalty and gas rental or royalty due 
to be paid under the terms of said lease."96 The grantee claimed that this 
clause entitled him to one-half of all royalty payable under the entire 
lease rather than restricting him to one-half of the royalty from wells 
drilled on the 90 acres granted to him. The Texas Commission of Ap-
94. See generally HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 9.1. See a/so WILLIAMS & MEYERS, 
supra note 66, § 340.2, at 242-43 (explaining that double fractions are often used due to what 
this author has coined "estate misconception"). 
95. 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, judgm't adopted). 
96. ld. at 830. 
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peals agreed, holding that the granting clause conveyed the one-half min-
eral interests in the 90 acres to the grantee and that the subject-to clause 
operated as a second grant that conveyed a one-half interest in the roy-
alty under the entire 320 acre tract. 97 Thus, in 1925, the unfortunate 
legacy of Caruthers v. Leonard was realized, and the two-grant doctrine 
was born. 
This facet of the doctrine was subsequently used in three supreme 
court cases. The first was Richardson v. Hart 98 in 1945. The case in-
volved construction of a multiclause deed, but the same double fraction, 
1/16 of 1/8, was used in each clause.99 The appellate court had deter-
mined that the deed was ambiguous and affirmed the trial court's consid-
eration of the parties' construction of the instrument. 100 The Texas 
Supreme Court, however, determined that the deed was not ambiguous, 
but clearly "conveyed two separate and distinct estates in the land." 101 
The first was determined to be 1/16 of 1/8 or a 1/128 interest in the oil, 
gas, and minerals, and the second estate was 1/128 of the royalties paid 
under any lease (1/8 of 1/128 or 1/1024). 102 
The Hart decision is troublesome for two reasons. First, it assumes 
that it is logical for parties to use double fractions to convey a fractional 
interest in the mineral estate. The court was evidently unimpressed that 
one of the two fractions in the equation was the same as the royalty in the 
existing lease, 1/8. Yet, this should be considered patent evidence that 
the parties were functioning under the estate misconception and intended 
to convey a 1/16 mineral interest and the royalty that would be appurte-
nant thereto, 1/8 of 1/16. This would explain the use of the double frac-
tion, a question left unanswered by the court. 103 
Second, the court discounted the fact that the supposed "second 
conveyance" would follow as a matter of law from the holding that a 
97. Id. 
98. 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945). 
99. Id. at 394, 185 S.W.2d at 563. 
100. Richardson v. Hart, 183 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1944), modi-
fied, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945). 
101. Hart, 143 Tex. at 396, 185 S.W.2d at 564. 
102. /d. at 396, 185 S.W.2d at 565. (showing subsequent lease provided for a 1/8 royalty). 
103. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 67, § 327.2. Williams and Meyers recognize 
that the use of the double fraction results from the parties' mistaken conception that they own 
a 1/8 interest; they consider, however, that as a matter of construction the deed is unambigu-
ous, and if a mistake was made, the proper remedy is reformation. /d. In Richardson v. Hart, 
the court of appeals found that the successors to the parties to the deed had treated it as 
conveying a 1/128 mineral interest. 183 S.W.2d at 236. However, in the supreme court, the 
appellant argued that the use of the double fraction "1/16 of 1/8" was intended to convey 
1/16 of 1/8 of all the royalty. Richardson, 143 Tex. at 396, 185 S.W.2d at 564. A 1/16 
mineral interest would entitle a grantee to 1/16 of 1/8 of the royalty. 
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1/128 mineral interest had been conveyed: "The fact that it fixes the 
share in the present royalties the same as would have obtained by opera-
tion of law does not lessen its force and effect as a conveyance. As is 
often the case such payment of royalty might have been larger or smaller 
than a pro rata share." 104 
By emphasizing the truism that mineral owners can convey royalties 
under an existing lease in a proportion different from the size of the min-
eral estate conveyed, the opinion in Richardson v. Hart detracts from the 
fact that parties rarely intend to do so. 105 From this premise, the court 
proceeded to use the two-grant doctrine when it was unnecessary and 
propagated a rule of construction that detracts from the parties' true 
intent. 
In a 1953 case, Benge v. Scharbauer, 106 the Texas court again cham-
pioned the right of parties to provide for disproportionate conveyances of 
mineral and royalty interests and achieved new levels of absurdity when 
the two-grant doctrine was applied in conjunction with the Duhig doc-
trine. In Benge, the grantor conveyed land to the grantee and reserved a 
3/8 mineral interest. 107 The deed also gave the grantee the right to exe-
cute all future leases but required that "said leases shall provide for the 
payment of three-eight[h]s (3/8) of all the bonuses, rentals and royalties 
to the grantors."108 Under Duhig, the grantor's mineral interest was re-
duced from 3/8 to 1/8. 109 However, the court held that the grantor was 
entitled to 3/8 of royalty, bonus, and rentals, because to hold otherwise 
would suggest that "the parties are powerless" to provide for dispropor-
tionate conveyances of mineral and royalty, bonus, and rentals. 110 
A year later, in Woods v. Sims, 111 the Texas Supreme Court relied 
on Benge, Hart, and Hoffman to further propagate the view that three-
104. Hart, 143 Tex. at 396, 185 S.W.2d at 565. 
105. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 67 ("The oft-repeated expression that a 
grantor has the power to convey by one instrument different interests in the possibility of 
reverter and under the subsisting lease should not obscure the fact that very few grantors really 
intend to convey interests of different magnitude."). 
106. 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953). 
107. /d. at 450, 259 S.W.2d at 167. 
108. /d. at 452, 259 S.W.2d at 168. 
109. /d. Duhig applied because there was an outstanding 1/4 mineral interest in a third 
party. /d. 
110. Benge, 152 Tex. at 454, 259 S.W.2d at 169. Professors Meyers and Williams labeled 
this opinion "deplorable" since it created a mineral interest "something like the Cheshire Cat 
of Alice in Wonderland: ' . .. and this time it vanished quite slowly, beginning with the end of 
the tail, and ending with the grin, which remained some time after the rest of it had gone.' " 
Charles J. Meyers & Howard R. Williams, Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.: A Further 
Comment, 35 TEX. L. REV. 363, 371 (1957). 
Ill. 154 Tex. 59, 273 S.W.2d 617 (1954). 
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grant mineral deeds convey separate and distinct estates in land. 112 Iron-
ically, most of these opinions also. recited four comers principles. 113 
Their holdings subvert those principles, however, by using the two-grant 
doctrine to justify viewing separate clauses in isolation. 
The repeated use of the first facet of the two-grant doctrine by the 
Texas Supreme Court from 1925 to 1955 deceptively suggests that it was 
settled precedent for construing a deed to convey separate, and usually 
disproportionate, interests in minerals and royalties. Yet, the doctrine 
was frequently ignored or discounted during this period. In 1933, the 
commission of appeals, in Mitchell v. Simms, 114 overturned the lower 
court's application of the two-grant theory with facts very similar to 
those in Hoffman. 115 In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 116 the 
supreme court again ignored the Hoffman analysis, 117 and in 1957, an 
appellate court painstakingly distinguished it in Robinson v. Humble Oil 
& Refining Co. 118 
In spite of the ethereal presence of the two-grant doctrine from 1925 
to 1957, it must be recognized that the Texas Supreme Court had ap-
proved one facet of the doctrine: its application to hold that two differ-
ent, and usually disproportionate, interests-the mineral and royalty, can 
be created by one deed in a particular tract of land. The second facet, 
112. Id. at 65, 273 S.W.2d at 621. In Woods, a multiclause deed used the fraction 25/200 
in every clause. In one clause, however, it was provided that an undivided 25 acre mineral 
interest was conveyed. Id. at 64, 273 S.W.2d at 620. It was subsequently determined that the 
grantor owned 226.88 acres rather than 200. The court held that the deed conveyed a 
25/226.88 mineral interest but a 25/200 interest in the royalty. Id. The disproportionate 
interests were justified " [s]ince different estates in the minerals in place and in the royalty 
payable under the lease may be conveyed by the same instrument." /d. at 65, 273 S.W.2d at 
621. 
113. Id. at 64, 273 S.W.2d at 620-21 (stating that court will construe contradictory parts 
of an instrument to harmonize with one another and not strike down a part unless the conflict 
is irreconcilable); Benge, 152 Tex. at 451, 259 S.W.2d at 167 (holding that all parts of the 
instrument must be given effect if possible and court must construe the language of the instru-
ment to harmonize); Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828, 830 (Tex. Comm'n 
App. 1925, judgm't adopted) (stating that instrument must be made to speak consistently as a 
whole). 
114. 63 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, holding approved). 
115. See id. at 373-74. Professor Williams opined that this case cast considerable doubt on 
the validity of the Hoffman rule. See Howard R. Williams, Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum 
Co. : The 'Subject To' Clause in Mineral and Royalty Deeds, 30 TEX. L. REV. 395, 417 (1952). 
116. 146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.2d 355 (1947). 
117. /d. at 225, 205 S.W.2d at 360. Compare with Hoffman, 273 S.W. at 830 (Humble 
holding the document ambiguous, whereas Hoffman used the two-grant theory to hold the 
deed unambiguous). The majority in Humble cited Hoffman, but only for the proposition that 
"where the language of the grant is ambiguous, it is to be construed against grantors rather 
than against grantee." Humble, 146 Tex. at 224, 205 S.W. at 360. Professor Williams consid-
ered Humble an implicit rejection of Hoffman. See Williams, supra note 115, at 417-19. 
118. 301 S.W.2d 938, 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, writ ref 'd n.r.e.). 
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using the doctrine to hold that either a mineral or royalty interest is con-
veyed in different sizes at different times, was not embraced by the 
supreme court until Jupiter Oil. 119 Instead, the court had ignored the 
expansion facet in Garrett v. Dils Co. 120 in 1957, when presented with 
facts very similar to those in Alford, 121 Lucke/, 122 and Jupiter Oil. 123 
Without mentioning Garrett, the appellate court in Alford held that 
the expansion facet should be applied. 124 That opinion was reversed by 
the supreme court and should be considered as a rejection of the expan-
sion facet.125 With Alford overruled, the question becomes whether the 
two-grant theory's expansion facet should or could be resurrected. 
2. The Expansion Facet 
The appellate court in Alford decided that the deed was unambigu-
ous and could be construed under the expansion facet of the two-grant 
doctrine. 126 Therefore, it held that the deed conveyed an undivided 1/16 
mineral interest under an existing lease (since the double fraction 1/2 of 
1/8 was used in the granting clause), which expanded to a 1/2 interest 
after the termination of that lease (since that fraction was used in the 
future-lease clause). 127 The opinion cites three cases, none of which men-
tion or apply either facet of the two-grant doctrine. 128 It does cite 
119. Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1992). 
120. 157 Tex. 92, 299 S.W.2d 904, 906-07 (1957) (see discussion of Garrett, infra parts 
III.B.3, V). 
121. Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984). 
122. Lucke] v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991). 
123. Jupiter, 819 S.W.2d at 466. 
124. Krum v. Alford, 653 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983), rev'd , 671 
S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984). The court does not use the term "expansion facet." That is this 
author's term. However, the court does use the concept. 
125. Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 874. In a post-Alford decision, an appellate court determined 
that Alford had negated the expansion facet where a clause irreconcilably conflicts with the 
granting clause, but had not negated the Hoffman facet. See Hawkins v. Texas Oil and Gas 
Corp., 724 S.W.2d 878, 886 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ ref 'd n.r.e.) (tracing history of 
Hoffman facet and determining it is still viable since Alford involved expansion). 
126. The court does not use the term "expansion facet. " 
127. Alford, 653 S.W.2d at 466. 
128. /d. The first case cited is Associated Oil Co. v. Hart, 277 S.W. 1043 (Tex. Comm'n 
App. 1925, judgm't adopted). The issue in that case was whether a grant of property, de-
scribed by metes and bounds, and a subsequent reservation of all minerals under the property 
was void for repugnancy. /d. at 1043. The court held it was not void because the grant was 
general and the reservation specific. /d. at 1044. Therefore, the effect of the deed was to create 
a permissible severance of the mineral and surface estates. /d. at 1045. The case does not 
involve the construction of a multiclause deed with conflicting fractions. Therefore, it is not 
authority for either facet of the two-grant doctrine. Instead, the opinion urges the rejection of 
arbitrary rules in favor of ascertaining the intent of the parties from the whole document. /d. 
at 1044. 
The second case relied upon is Texas and Pac. R.R. Co. v. Martin, 123 Tex. 383, 71 
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Woods 129 and Hart, 130 but only for the proposition that different estates 
in minerals may be conveyed by the same instrument. 131 Its only men-
S.W.2d 867 (1934). This case does not involve a multiclause deed, a conveyance or a reserva-
tion of oil, gas, or minerals. The issue is whether a deed that granted land "for depot purposes 
and uses" conveyed an easement or a fee. /d. at 386, 71 S.W.2d 869, 869. 
The third case cited is Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, 161 Tex. 122, 338 S.W.2d 143 
(1960). Delta does involve a multiclause deed, but the deed in this case used the fraction 1/4 
throughout. The controversy arose due to the reservation by the grantor of "the lease interest 
and all future rentals." /d. at 125, 338 S.W.2d at 145. The court relied on Garrett v. Dils Co., 
157 Tex. 92, 93, 299 S.W.2d 904, 905 (1957), and held that the term "lease interest" referred to 
the right to execute leases, or the executive right. Therefore, although the grantees received a 
1/4 mineral interest, they did not have the right to lease that interest. Delta, 161 Tex. at 128, 
338 S.W.2d at 146. Once again, the two-grant doctrine was not used. On the contrary, this 
case refers to criticism of Tipps v. Bodine, 101 S.W.2d 1076 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936, 
writ ref'd), which is relied upon heavily in Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 
1992), in applying the expansion facet of the two-grant doctrine. Delta, 161 Tex. at 128, 338 
S.W.2d at 147 n.3. 
Although the three cases cited by the court in Alford are totally inapposite to the two-
grant doctrine, there are other cases that would have been more direct authority for the two-
grant expansion facet. For example, in Schubert v. Miller, 119 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. Civ. 
App.-Texarkana 1938, no writ), the court of appeals reversed a judgment on an oil and gas 
lease for failure to join necessary parties, on the premise that the interests in the deed would be 
larger after the termination of an existing lease. The case of Etter v. Texaco, 371 S.W.2d 702, 
704 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.) has been considered an expansion-facet 
case, yet, its exegesis is representative of the faulty use of authorities that permeates most cases 
confronted with construction of a multiclause deed. In Etter, the granting clause provided for 
a 1/32 interest or 1/4 of 1/8 interest in the minerals; the subject-to clause covered 1/4 of all 
the royalty; the future-lease clause provided that the grantor was entitled to all lease interests 
and all future rentals. The parties had deleted, with a typewriter, another portion of the form 
that allowed the parties to state the interests owned by the grantor and grantee in the minerals 
and rents. /d. It was argued that the use of the double fraction and the deletion meant the 
parties intended a conveyance of 1/4 of the royalty rather than 1/32 of the royalty or a 1/32 
mineral interest. The court held that a 1/32 mineral interest was conveyed. Etter does not 
appear to hold that any expansion of interest occurred. Although the facts are more akin to 
those in Garrett v. Dils Co. than those in Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, the Etter court uncon-
vicingly held that Delta controlled instead of Garrett. /d. at 705. As in Richardson v. Hart, 
185 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1945), the court refused to accord any significance to the use of double 
fractions. Etter, 371 S.W.2d at 706. Similarly, rather than use a four comers approach and 
consider the effect of the express deletion, the court refused to consider it at all. /d. The Etter 
court completes its ad hoc analysis by quoting a law review article out of context. /d. (quoting 
but misapplying Joseph W. Morris, Mineral Interest or Royalty Interests?, 29 SW. LEGAL 
FoUND. 259, 269). The court cited the Morris article for the proposition that language in the 
future lease clause is unreliable. See Etter, 371 S.W.2d at 706. The article, however, does not 
make that suggestion. Instead, it stresses that the subject-to and future lease clauses are unnec-
essary, because the grantee is "entitled to share in bonuses, rentals and royalties in the same 
identical proportion as his mineral ownership bears to the entire mineral estate." See Morris, 
supra, at 269. The author then cites Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum in support of the proposi-
tion that these clauses have been construed in a manner that frustrates intent. /d. 
129. Alford, 653 S.W.2d at 466. 
130. /d. at 465-66. 
131. Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 273 S.W.2d 617 (1954). 
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tion of Garrett is in support of the greatest estate possible rule. 132 As in 
the dissent, the court did not consider the use of double fractions to show 
intent or to suggest an ambiguity. 133 
The expansion facet was also advocated as the proper construction 
method by the dissent when Alford reached the supreme court. In sup-
port of that position, Chief Justice Pope viewed Garrett v. Dils Co. as 
applying the expansion facet of the two-grant doctrine, while most com-
mentators have viewed it as rejecting that doctrine. 134 An analysis of 
Garrett, however, reveals that the court was interpreting the deed under 
the four comers doctrine rather than the two-grant doctrine. 
3. Garrett v. Oils Company-Rejection of the Two-Grant Doctrine 
Garrett involved the construction of a three-grant deed. The grant-
ing clause conveyed to the grantee "an undivided one sixty-fourth inter-
est in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals." 135 The subject-to 
clause provided that the conveyance "includes one-eighth of all of the oil 
royalty" 136 due under the existing lease. The future-lease clause pro-
vided that: 
It is understood and agreed that one-eighth of the money rent-
als which may be paid to extend the term within which a well may 
be begun under the terms of said lease is to be paid to the said 
Grantee and in event that the above described lease for any reason 
becomes cancelled or forfeited, then and in that event an undivided 
one-eighth of the lease interest and all future rentals on said land 
for oil, gas and other mineral privileges shall be owned by said 
Grantee, he owning one-eighth of one-eighth of all oil, gas, and 
other minerals in and under said lands, together with one-eighth 
interest in all future rents. 137 
The initial lease terminated and another was executed which pro-
vided for a one-eighth royalty. The controversy was whether the succes-
sor to the grantee was entitled to 1/8 or 1/64 of the 1/8 royalty. 138 The 
court noted that the granting clause purported to convey a 1/64 mineral 
132. Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945). 
133. /d. at 467 (Young, J., dissenting) ("Use of a double fraction in a deed is not ambigu-
ous; the reader may calculate the interest very simply."). 
134. Compare Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 876 (Tex. 1984) (Pope, C.J., dissenting) with authori-
ties cited supra note 66. Chief Justice Pope viewed Garrett as holding "that the intent of the 
grantor was to convey a royalty of l/64 or one-eighth of the one-eighth royalty .... [T]he 
Garrett court held that a different and a greater interest was conveyed upon the reverter of the 
outstanding lease." Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 876. 
135. Garrett v. Oils Co., 157 Tex. 92, 93, 299 S.W.2d 904, 905 (1957). 
136. /d. 
137. /d. at 93-94, 299 S.W.2d at 905. 
138. /d. at 94, 299 S.W.2d at 905. 
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interest. It chose not to view that fraction alone as representing intent, 
however: 
Had other language in the deed not disclosed what the parties un-
derstood "one sixty-fourth" to mean, it would be our duty to give 
those words their usual meaning and construe the deed as a min-
eral deed to an undivided one sixty-fourth of the minerals in place. 
But there follows the granting clause language which clearly de-
fines what the parties understood 'one sixty-fourth' of the minerals 
to mean. 
Construing this deed as a whole and giving effect to each and 
every provision thereof, we are led to the conclusion that the roy-
alty conveyed under future leases was the same as that conveyed 
under the then existing lease,-that is to say, one-eighth thereof. 
We further conclude that having the right to receive one-eighth of 
the royalty, together with a one-eighth lease interest and future 
rentals thereon, the respondent in reality is the owner of one-eighth 
of the minerals in the land. 139 
Since the controversy in Garrett concerned the royalty payable 
under a new lease, rather than the size and type of interest conveyed, 
some of the language in the opinion is prone to a two-grant spin. Yet, 
unlike the Alford opinions, the court in Garrett did not take the fraction 
in the granting clause at face value but interpreted it in light of several 
facts. It considered that the subject-to clause used the fraction 1/8, the 
future-lease clause used a double fraction, 1/8 of 1/8, and the usual roy-
alty provided in a mineral lease is 1/8. 140 In concluding that the deed 
conveyed an undivided 1/8 of the minerals, the court also noted that the 
deed gave all the rights incident to ownership of 1/8 of the minerals to 
the grantee. 141 
139. /d. at 95-97, 299 S.W.2d at 906-07. 
140. /d. at 96, 299 S.W.2d at 906-07. 
141. /d. at 96, 299 S.W.2d at 907. In a post-Alford appellate case, Hawkins v. Texas Oil 
and Gas Corp., 724 S.W.2d 878, 886 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court 
determined that the Hoffman facet should have survived the overruling of that case, but not 
the expansion facet where a clause irreconcilably conflicts with the granting clause. The court 
noted that Garrett had mistakenly been labeled a two-grant doctrine case and then considered 
the application of that case. /d. at 884. It held that even if the Garrett approach survived 
Alford, Garrett could be distinguished because in the deed at issue the grantee did not receive 
all of the attributes of ownership of the mineral estate, as in Garrett. /d. at 888. This holding 
represents too narrow a reading of Garrett and should be rejected in light of Lucke/. The 
Texas Supreme Court has clearly held that a deed need not convey all attributes ofthe mineral 
estate to a grantee in order to interpret it as a mineral, rather than a royalty conveyance. In 
Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1986), the court construed the deed as conveying a 
mineral interest even though the grantee did not receive the executive right or the right to 
share in bonus and rentals. /d. at 120. The Hawkins court confused two separate construction 
issues: First, how to determine the size of the interest when a deed contains conflicting frac-
tions in a multiclause deed; and second, how to determine whether a mineral or royalty inter-
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The consideration of these facts to explain the use of the fraction 
1/64 as meaning a 1/8 mineral interest demonstrates that the two-grant 
doctrine, as it was applied in the Alford opinions, was not used. The 
Garrett holding was not that there was an expansion of interest or that 
separate conveyances were made. Instead, the Garrett court's approach 
rejected the Hoffman-Hart view of a multiclause deed as making separate 
conveyances. Another distinctive aspect of the Garrett approach is that 
it recognizes the role of double fractions in determining intent. 142 
The Garrett court's approach also implicitly accorded significance to 
the estate misconception. This is evident in its considering the use of 
double fractions and taking judicial notice of the fact that the usual roy-
alty is 1/8. If the grantor desired to convey 1/8 of the entire mineral 
estate, and he mistakenly considered that he only owned 1/8 of the min-
erals due to an existing lease entitling him to a 1/8 royalty, then he 
would use the fraction 1/64, or the double fraction 1/8 of 1/8. 
In summary, the Garrett court's approach can be characterized as 
explicitly adopting a four comers approach with implicit consideration of 
the estate misconception, and as rejecting the view that a multiclause 
deed is used to make separate conveyances. In contrast, in the Alford 
decisions the expansion facet of the two-grant doctrine was applied and 
each clause of the deed was viewed in a vacuum. There was no attempt 
to harmonize the conflicting fractions in light of other language in the 
deed or to consider why conflicting and double fractions were used. In-
stead, it appears both the majority in the appellate decision and the dis-
sent in the Texas Supreme Court decision adopted the distorting view of 
Hoffman, Hart, Benge, and Woods that the use of the multiclause deed 
evinces intent to make separate conveyances. 
The majority opinion in Alford adopted an equally egregious posi-
tion by focusing only on the fraction used in the granting clause. Lucke/ 
should be viewed as eradicating both of these approaches by reinstating 
ascertainment of the intent of the parties as the primary postulate in deed 
construction. 
IV. THE LUCKEL AND JUPITER DECISIONS 
A. Luckel v. White 
In Lucke/ v. White, the Texas Supreme Court faced the problem of 
construing a multiclause deed for the first time since its decision in Alford 
est was conveyed. Altman provides guidelines on the latter issue but does not involve 
conflicting fractions. To resolve that issue, this author suggests that Lucke/ should be viewed 
as a reaffirmation of the Garrett v. Dils Co. approach. 
142. Garrett, 157 Tex. at 95, 299 S.W.2d at 906. 
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v. Krum. As in Alford, the granting clause and the future-lease clause 
used different fractions, and the parties did not assert that the deed was 
ambiguous. 143 In Lucke/, the granting clause provided that the grantor 
conveyed to Luckel "an undivided one thirty-second (1!32nd) royalty 
interest." The habendum and warranty clause followed and referred to 
the above described 1/32 royalty interest. The subject-to clause provided 
that the grantee "shall receive one-fourth of any and all royalties paid 
under the terms of said lease." The future-lease clause stated that it is 
"expressly understood and agreed" that the grantee "shall be entitled to 
one-fourth of any and all royalties" under future leases. 144 
The existing lease terminated, and the property was subject to other 
leases providing for a 1/6 royalty. The grantee's successors claimed they 
were entitled to 1/4 of all of the royalties under these leases, or 1/24. 
The grantor's successor argued that the deed entitled them only to a fixed 
1/32 royalty. 145 
The appellate court applied Alford. 146 The supreme court held that 
Alford could dictate even though it involved a mineral interest, and a 
royalty interest was clearly conveyed to Luckel. 147 Rather than apply 
the repugnant-to-the-grant rule, the court held that "the majority in Al-
ford incorrectly failed to harmonize the provisions under the four comers 
rule." 148 The Lucke/ court ruled that the deed could be "properly har-
monized to mean that the interest conveyed was one-fourth of the royal-
ties reserved under the existing and all future leases." 149 The use of the 
fraction 1/32 in the warranty clause was harmonized by holding that the 
grantee was to "receive not less than 1!32nd of production, which is one-
143. Lucke! v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (~ex. 1991). 
144. /d. Additionally, in a final clause, the grant explained that since the grantor only 
owned one-half of the royalties under the terms of the present existing lease, and the other one-
half had been conveyed by her to her children, grantor "conveyed one-half of the one-sixteenth 
(1!16th) royalty now reserved by her." /d. The court does not discuss this language in its 
analysis. 
145. /d. 
146. Lucke! v. White, 792 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1990), rev'd , 
819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991). The supreme court also rejected the alternative holding adopted 
by the appellate court that required harmonizing the deed to hold that a fixed 1/32 royalty was 
conveyed. The supreme court determined that this was improper because it alters the clear 
language of the future-lease clause to convey a 1/4 royalty. Lucke/, 819 S.W.2d at 464. 
147. Lucke/, 819 S.W.2d at 464. The deed did not have conflicting references to royalty 
and mineral interests. The interest was consistently referred to as a royalty interest and the 
grantee did not receive any of the attributes of the mineral estate. Therefore, the court was not 
presented with the additional problem of determining whether a royalty or mineral interest 
was conveyed. See discussion of Hawkins, supra note 141. 
148. Lucke/, 819 S.W.2d at 464. 
149. /d. at 465. 
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fourth of the usual one-eighth."150 
Since the court held that the deed conveyed the same fractional roy-
alty interest under existing and future leases, it appears that the expan-
sion facet was not used. The first facet of the two-grant doctrine is 
inapposite, since the question in Lucke! was not whether the deed created 
separate grants of mineral and royalty interests. lSI However, the court 
did use language consistent with the view that the deed created separate 
grants under the granting clause and the future lease clause. Most nota-
bly, it held that the language in the future lease clause is as effective to 
grant an interest as the language of the granting clause. 152 It also cited 
Richardson v. Hart and Woods v. Sims, two of the supreme court cases 
that used the Hoffman facet of the two-grant doctrine. 153 Yet, the court 
also held that its method of harmonizing is consistent with the approach 
used in Garrett v. Dils Co. 154 
Determining which rule or rules of construction the supreme court 
intends to use to supplant Alford requires harmonizing its simultaneous 
reliance on the Hoffman-Hart line of cases and Garrett. The most prob-
able explanation is that the court still clings to the distorted view of the 
multiclause deed as making separate grants. Another explanation is that 
another version of the two-grant doctrine was formulated. Since the 
court held that the same interest was conveyed under existing and future 
leases despite the use of different fractions, this version of the two-grant 
doctrine (if it exists) is different than the expansion facet used in Jupiter 
Oil and urged in the Alford decisions. It also differs from the application 
of the two-grant doctrine in Richardson v. Hart. 155 In those opinions, no 
attempt is made to harmonize the fractions used in light of other lan-
guage in the deed or the fact that the usual royalty has been assumed to 
be 1/8. Instead, the court accepted the fractions in each clause as 
written. 
150. Id. 
151. See Luckel v. White, 792 S.W.2d 485, 491 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990), 
rev'd, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991) (seeking to "foreclose any question of the applicability of the 
'double grant theory'" of Hoffman). 
152. Lucke/, 819 S.W.2d at 463 . The court cited Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549, 553, 
84 S.W.2d 442, 444 (1935). That case is not authority for viewing a future-lease clause as 
making a separate conveyance. It merely determined that a mother hubbard clause was suffi-
cient to include additional acreage in a lease. Id. 
As another example of the use of the two-grant doctrine, the supreme court in Lucke/ 
determined that the future-lease clause "presently conveyed the possibility of reverter to one-
fourth fractional interest of the royalty inte£est." Lucke/, 819 S.W.2d at 464. It also focused 
on the interest conveyed after termination of the existing lease. /d. 
153. Id. at 462-64. 
154. Id. at 464. 
155. 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945). 
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Another possible explanation for the two-grant tendencies apparent 
in the Lucke/ decision is that the question for decision was framed as 
"what effect the one-fourth language of the future lease clause should 
have" on the use of the four-corners rule and other traditional rules of 
construction. 156 The answer given is that the fraction in the future lease 
clause, as well as the assumption that the parties contemplated only the 
usual one-eighth royalty, explain the use of a conflicting fraction in the 
granting clause. When the holding in Lucke/ is posed in this manner, it 
appears that the four corners rule and the Garrett approach as outlined in 
Part II, and not the two-grant doctrine, have been designated as the suc-
cessors to the repugnant-to-the-grant rule. 
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Lucke/ also send mixed 
signals as to whether the majority opinion should be viewed as adopting 
any version of the two-grant doctrine. The concurring judge agreed that 
Alford should be overruled and that the intent in the deed at issue was to 
convey 1/4 of the royalties reserved under the existing and all future 
leases. 157 This indicates that Justice Mauzy did not assume that the ex-
pansion facet was or should be used. He was compelled, however, to 
suggest that Chief Justice Pope's dissenting opinion in Alford should be 
expressly adopted. 158 As demonstrated in Part II, Pope viewed Garrett 
as using the expansion facet. In describing Pope's opinion, however, the 
concurring judge explained that Pope rejected arbitrary rules and urged 
determining intent from a consideration of all parts of the instrument. 159 
Thus, the concurring opinion seems to extoll the virtues of the four cor-
ners rule rather than the two-grant doctrine. 
The dissent clearly views the majority as using the two-grant doc-
trine. In chastising the court for doing so, the dissenting opinion in-
cludes the following quote from a well-respected oil and gas treatise: 
"The oft-repeated expression that a grantor has the power to convey by 
one instrument different interests in the possibility of reverter and under 
the subsisting lease should not obscure the fact that very few grantors 
really intend to convey interests of different magnitude." 160 Although 
that advice should be heeded, the majority in Lucke/ did not hold that 
interests of different magnitude were conveyed. On the contrary, the 
court held that the same interest was conveyed under existing and future 
leases. The dissent would discard the distorting view of the multiclause 
deed as making separate conveyances. However, it would apply the frac-
156. Lucke/, 819 S.W.2d at 462. 
157. /d. at 465 (Mauzy, J., concurring). 
158. /d. 
159. /d. 
160. /d, at 466 (Phillips, C.J. , dissenting). 
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tion in the granting clause, 1/32, and explain the use of the fraction 1/4 
in the future lease clause by assuming the parties "carelessly referred to 
the interest under future leases as one-fourth of all royalties rather than 
one fourth of a l/8th royalty." 161 The more likely explanation is not that 
the grantors were careless in the future lease clause, but that they as-
sumed the fraction 1/32 was the proper way to convey a 1/4 royalty in 
the granting clause since the land was under a lease providing for a 1/8 
royalty.162 
B. Jupiter Oil Company v. Snow 
While the Lucke/ opinion sends mixed signals about the approach it 
adopts, the majority opinion in Jupiter Oil clearly applies the expansion 
facet of the two-grant doctrine. The granting clause in the 1918 deed in 
Jupiter Oil conveyed an "undivided 1/16 interest in and to all the oil, gas, 
and other minerals." 163 The deed acknowledged that the tract was under 
a lease and in the third paragraph provided that the grantee was to have 
an undivided 1/2 interest in the event the lease terminated. 164 
As in Lucke/, the issue in Jupiter Oil was framed specifically as, 
what is the interest conferred in the deed after the end of the existing 
lease?165 The court began its opinion by holding that Alford v. Krum is 
inapplicable since this deed "unambiguously grants a one-sixteenth inter-
est in the mineral estate as well as seven-sixteenths of the grantor's possi-
bility of reverter." 166 The opinion concludes by holding that, " [t]he 
effect of this grant is that when the [existing] lease ended, Jupiter's inter-
est in the mineral estate simultaneously expanded into a full one-half by 
operation of law." 167 
The analysis in Jupiter Oil is troublesome for several reasons. First, 
161. Id. at 465. The dissent assumes that it would be natural to use a double fraction to 
express intent to convey a 1/32 interest. 
162. Id. at 466. The dissenting judge also saw no reason to overrule A/ford since "no party 
has urged, nor does the court find, a conflict between the granting clause and any other clause 
of the deed." Id. Other than the fact that Alford involved a conveyance of a mineral interest 
and Lucke/ involved a royalty, it is difficult to distinguish between the two. Both cases in-
volved the use of a smaller fraction in the granting clause than in the future-lease clause. I d. at 
460. 
163. Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991). Unlike the deed in Lucke/, 
this deed involved the conveyance of a mineral interest. Id. at 467. It also predates the Ca-
ruthers decision. However, given the unsettled nature of oil and gas jurisprudence at that early 
date it seems certain that the estate misconception explains the conflicting fractions. See supra 
part II. 
164. Jupiter Oil Co., 819 S.W.2d at 468. 
165. Id. at 467. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 469. 
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as the concurring judge notes, it is difficult to distinguish between the 
facts of this case and the facts of A/ford. 168 Second, the court adopted 
the reasoning of a 1936 Texas appellate court case, Tipps v. Bodine, 169 
which committed the estate misconception. That case involved a post-
Caruthers multiclause deed that used the fraction 1/16 in the granting 
clause and the fraction 1/2 in the subject-to and future-lease clauses. 170 
The court described the effect of the lease as giving the lessee a determi-
nable fee in 7/8 of the minerals, with the grantor retaining 1/8. 171 As 
explained in Part II, the estates created by an oil and gas lease are a 
determinable fee in 8/8 of the mineral estate in the lessee, leaving the 
lessor with a possibility of reverter in 8/8. The provision for payment of 
royalty is the economic translation of the mineral estate owner's appurte-
nant right in the mineral estate. 
Since the Tipps court believed, due to the estate misconception, that 
the grantor owned 1/8 of the minerals after the lease, it assumed the 
fraction 1/16 was the proper way to express intent to convey 1/2 of all 
the grantor owned at the time. The court, therefore, affirmed the trial 
court's ruling that had permitted reformation by replacing the fraction 
1/16 with 1/2. 172 In Jupiter, however, the court adopts Tipps' descrip-
tions of the estates, but then fails to assess, or harmonize, the use of the 
fraction 1/16. Therefore, the decision will propagate, rather than eradi-
cate, the estate misconception. 
The Jupiter decision is also troubling because the holding comports 
with the expansion facet of the two-grant doctrine, but it does not cite 
any of the two-grant cases or urge the adoption of the Alford dissent or 
appellate opinion. The opinion also fails to mention Garrett v. Dils Co. 
It is perplexing that it cites Caruthers v. Leonard without noting that it 
has been overruled or assessing its unfortunate effect on mineral and roy-
alty conveyances. 
The Jupiter decision cannot be reconciled with the holding in 
Lucke/. The Lucke/ opinion expressly approves the Garrett opinion and 
the Jupiter opinion fails to mention it. In Lucke/, the court harmonized 
the conflicting fractions and held that the same quantum of interest was 
168. /d. (Hecht, J., concurring) ("If Alford and this case are not twins, there is certainly a 
strong resemblance between them."). 
169. 101 S.W.2d 1076, 1076 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936, writ ref'd). 
170. /d. The date of the deed was 1930. /d. The future lease clause also provided that the 
grantee would own "1/16 of all oil, gas and other minerals in and under said lands, together 
with 1/2 interest in all future events." /d. at 1078. 
171. /d. 
172. /d. See also Thomas H. Lee, Ambiguity and the "Subject To" Clause In Texas Min-
eral Conveyancing, 5 S. TEX. L.J. 313, 319 (1961) (discussing court's analysis in permitting 
reformation). 
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conve'jed \lnder ex\'i>t\ng and t\lt\lre lease.'&, 'flhl\e \n Jupiter tb.e co\lrt ai>-
plied the expansion facet of the two-grant doctrine. If the Jupiter opinion 
had used the Luckel-Garrett approach, the holding would have been that 
a 1/2 mineral interest was conveyed under existing and future leases. 
This would not change the ultimate result since the original lease had 
terminated, but it would clarify the state of the law. It would also eradi-
cate the estate misconception and the Hoffman-Hart view of multiclause 
deeds. Instead, the current state of the law for construing mineral or 
royalty deeds with conflicting fractions is unclear. To provide clarity, 
the Jupiter decision should be discounted due to its faulty exegesis, and 
Lucke/ should be viewed as a reaffirmation of the approach in Garrett v. 
Dils Co. 
V. ADOPTION AND REFINING OF THE GARRETT APPROACH 
A. Response to Criticisms of Garrett 
The Garrett v. Dils Co. approach has been criticized as using refor-
mation disguised as construction in violation of the parol evidence 
rule. 173 The approach used in that case, however, does not purport to 
discover actual subjective intent, which is the basis of reformation. Nor 
is it relying on outside evidence to contradict the writing in violation of 
the parol evidence rule.'74 Instead, it adopts an objective explanation of 
intent based on the fractions used in the four comers of the document. 
This should be permissible under the liberal, harmonizing approach reaf-
firmed in Lucke/. The court's explicit consideration of the usual 1/8 roy-
alty and its implicit consideration of the estate misconception are also 
permissible under the general principle that meaning can be determined, 
173. See HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 2.7, at 95 (remarking that Garrett is an example of 
courts, "on behalf of befuddled litigants, benevolently and improperly granting reformation in 
the guise of a judgment for title."). In another section of his treatise, Professor Hemingway 
cites Garrett as support for the following statement: "Although courts usually follow the 
[rules for admission of parol evidence], instances may be found where relief in the form of 
reformation, modification, etc., has been given in suits for the purpose of determining title." 
/d. § 3.2, at 121. But see, Lee, supra note 172, at 326, (stating that the court in Garrett "does 
not add to the erroneous notion that after a lease the lessee owns 7/8 of the minerals and the 
lessor 1/8 but, [sic] it simply takes into consideration that some people think so, a laudable and 
practical approach to the problem."). 
174. "Evidence offered strictly for the purpose of aiding in the construction of a written 
instrument is not within the prohibition of the Parol Evidence Rule." McCORMICK & RAY, 
supra note 27, § 1681 at 399-400. That rule is invoked to prevent contradiction or additions 
once meaning has been established. See generally, Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and 
Construction of Contracts, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 833 (1964) (discussing general interpretation 
doctrines); Note, The Interpretation of Mineral and Royalty Deeds-The Manipulation of the 
Parol Evidence Rule, 38 MINN. L. REv. 857 (1954) (applying parol evidence rule to mineral 
and royalty deeds). 
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as a matter of law, in light of the circumstances existing at the time the 
document was drafted. 175 Given the imprecise nature of the litany of 
rules courts recite for determining ambiguity and the use of extrinsic evi-
dence, it is counterproductive to reject the Garrett approach as violative 
of those rules. Instead, Lucke/ 's reaffirmation of the Garrett approach 
should be welcomed as another instance in which Texas courts have 
adopted specific rules for particular constructional problems to enhance 
title stability. 
B. The Garrett Approach Refined: Adoption of Specific Rules 
In order to further promote title certainty without sacrificing intent, 
the court should define the contours of the Garrett approach. This can 
be done by extracting guidelines from Garrett's analysis of the use of 
double fractions, which includes taking judicial notice of the fact that the 
usual royalty has been 1/8, its explicit rejection of the Hoffman-Hart 
view of the multiclause deed, and its implicit consideration of the estate 
misconception. These guidelines should include the following: 1) if the 
fraction in the future-lease clause times 1/8 equals the fraction in the 
granting clause, the fraction in the future lease clause expresses intent 
regarding the quantum of the present, as well as future, conveyance; 2) 
175. See supra part I for rules of construction. To subvert any allegations of disguised 
reformation or parol evidence violations, the court could take judicial notice of the estate mis-
conception as it has the usual 1/8 royalty in mineral leases. This should not be necessary, 
however, since it is within the purview of the court to formulate rules of construction unless 
they clearly conflict with settled principles. Courts have taken judicial notice of the fact that 
the usual royalty in an oil and gas lease is 1/8. See, e.g. , Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92, 96, 
299 S.W.2d 904-07 (1957); Badger v. King, 331 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 
1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Harrell v. Nash, 133 P.2d 748 (Okla. 1942). But see White v. 
White, 830 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (court refused to 
take judicial notice that usual royalty is 1/8). 
Rule 201(b) of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence provides that a judicially noticed fact 
must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either: (I) generally known within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination 
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. TEX. R. Evm, 20l(b). 
See also Olin Guy Wellborn Ill, Judicial Notice Under Article II of the Texas Rules of Evi-
dence, 19 ST. MARY's L.J. 2, 13 (1987). See generally E. F. Roberts, Judicial Notice: An Essay 
Concerning Human Misunderstanding, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1435, 1437 (1986); C. William 
Kraft, Comment, The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial Notice, 13 VILL. L. REv. 530, 
532, 552 (1968). See also Parten v. Cannon, 829 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, no 
writ). In Parten, the court was interpreting an oil and gas lease to determine if a filing require-
ment created a condition, which would cause automatic forfeiture if violated, or a covenant, 
which would not cause the entire lease to terminate. The court relied on the rule that if the 
surrounding circumstances suggest the contract is capable of only a single meaning, the court 
can confine itself to the writing. I d . at 330. The court determined that the surrounding cir-
cumstances, a letter, evinced no intent for a total forfeiture of the lease on portions maintained 
by production beyond the primary term. ld. at 331. 
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the use of double fractions should be considered in the interpretation pro-
cess, for example, if a double fraction is used to convey a mineral interest, 
which consists of 1/8 accompanied by another fraction, the accompany-
ing fraction is the intended quantum of the mineral estate to be con-
veyed;176 3) in light of the history behind the three-grant deed, a 
document should not be construed as making two grants due to the use 
of that form, unless additional evidence of intent is found; and 4) if the 
document cannot be harmonized under the first two rules, it should be 
considered ambiguous and extrinsic evidence should be considered. 177 
Title certainty has been a consistent goal for the Texas Supreme 
Court in formulating rules of construction. 178 The application of the 
Garrett approach and the foregoing recommended rules would promote 
this goal by permitting a determination of the estates created from the 
four corners of most multiclause deeds with conflicting fractions. A title 
examiner, then, could confidently determine ownership interests without 
litigation. 
C. The Garrett Approach Compared to Other Possible Rules for 
Construing Multiclause Deeds with Conflicting Fractions 
1. The Two-Grant Doctrine 
The two-grant doctrine does have a positive aspect: 1t 1s easy to 
apply, since fractions are taken at face value, which would aid title cer-
tainty. The goal of title certainty, however, should not be achieved at the 
176. See discussion of double fractions in Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 
563 (1945). This consideration of double fractions would change the result in a number of 
cases that have not attempted to ascertain the intent behind using double fractions from the 
four comers of the document. For example, in Harriss v. Ritter, 154 Tex. 474, 478, 279 
S.W.2d 845, 847 (1955), an instrument reserved 1/2 of 1/8 of the oil, gas and other mineral 
royalty and 1/2 of bonus and rentals. The court held that a 1/16 "of" royalty together with 
1/2 of bonus and rentals was reserved. Under the Garrett approach and proposed rules, the 
document would be interpreted to convey a 1/2 mineral interest, since the use of the double 
fraction can be explained by taking note of the usual royalty and the estate misconception. 
The rules should be used to determine if a mineral or royalty interest is being conveyed. 
See supra text accompanying notes 25-56. 
177. See e.g., Stag Sales Co. v. Flores, 697 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). When a drafter is functioning under the estate misconception, the 
fraction in the granting clause is smaller. See supra part II. This case is unusual in that the 
fraction in the future lease clause is smaller than the fraction in the granting clause. Therefore, 
the rules outlined above would not be applicable, and it would be appropriate to consider the 
conflicting fractions as creating an ambiguity that should be resolved through the use of extrin-
sic evidence. 
178. See Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex. 1986) ("We recognize the necessity 
for stability and certainty in the construction of mineral conveyances."); Moser v. United 
States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) (severance of mineral estate from surface 
estate). 
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expense of the parties' intent. Dean Kuntz commented on the competing 
goals of ascertaining intent and title stability: 
Nevertheless, the controlling policy is that certainty, though desir-
able, should be sacrificed in favor of preserving property owner-
ship; that it is not desirable to achieve certainty at the risk of 
producing injustice to parties who through ignorance or neglect 
inadvertently make a poor choice of words in attempting to express 
their intentions in a written instrument. 179 
It is not disputed that parties may convey interests in different sizes at 
different times. Given the history behind the advent of the three-grant 
deed, compounded by the pervasiveness of the estate misconception, it is 
unlikely that two grants were intended in conveyances using that deed 
form. 180 Therefore, applying the two-grant doctrine frustrates the intent 
of the parties. The Garrett approach is preferable because it provides a 
more accurate assessment of intent without sacrificing title certainty. 
2. The Kansas Approach 
In a 1984 Kansas Supreme Court case, the court took express notice 
of the estate misconception in construing a deed with conflicting frac-
tions.181 The court determined that an ambiguity existed which permit-
ted the use of extrinsic evidence. 182 This approach is laudable because it 
recognizes the explanation for conflicting fractions that insures an inter-
pretation reflecting actual intent. The necessity of litigation that follows 
the determination of ambiguity, however, would be detrimental to title 
certainty. 
179. EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS§ 16.1, at 474 (1987). 
180. See e.g., Snow v. Jupiter Oil Co., 802 S.W.2d 354, 358 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991), 
rev'd 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991) (evidence showed that parties had treated the deed as con-
veying 1/2 under the existing lease). The dissent in Lucke/ made this point and cited the 
Williams & Meyers treatise as support. See Lucke! v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 466 (Tex. 1991) 
(Phillips, C.J., dissenting). 
181. See Heyen v. Hartnett, 679 P.2d 1152, 1158 (Kan. 1984). The granting clause in 
Heyen provided for a 1/16 mineral interest, but the subject-to clause read, "an undivided 1/2 
interest in the Royalties, Rentals and Proceeds." /d. at 1154. The court quoted extensively 
from an earlier supreme court case that carefully explained the estate misconception. /d. at 
1158 (quoting Shepard v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 368 P.2d 19, 26 (Kan. 1962)). In 
Shepard, the court's analysis was very similar to that used in Garrett because the court deter-
mined there was no ambiguity since the conflicting fractions could be explained in light of the 
royalty reserved and the estate misconception. See Shepard, 368 P.2d at 26. See generally 
KuNTz, supra note 179, § 16.3, at 491. 
182. Heyen, 679 P.2d at 1158. But see Shepard, 368 P.2d at 26, in which the court, with 
analysis very similar to Garrett, determined that the conflicting fractions did not create an 
ambiguity. 
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3. Preferring the Subject-To or Future-Lease Clause 
Since the three-grant deed was used largely in response to Caruthers, 
it is likely that the subject-to clause or future-lease clause is an accurate 
expression of the mineral or royalty interest intended to be conveyed 
under existing and future leases. 183 The estate misconception also does 
not generally produce errors in those clauses. Preferring one of these 
clauses, however, would be committing the same error as in Alford of 
failing to determine intent from the entire document. Unlike an ap-
proach that prefers one clause over another, the Garrett approach is con-
gruous with the primary tenet of deed construction, the four corners rule. 
4. The Greatest-Estate-Possible Rule 
The rule that a deed should be construed to pass the greatest-estate-
possible is a venerable rule of construction that has been invoked in 
countless cases, including Garrett v. Dils Co. 184 This rule would promote 
title certainty, because the fraction that conveyed the largest estate would 
prevail. It suffers from the same malady as Alford, however, because it 
approves disregarding conflicting provisions in the deed, which is incon-
gruous with the four corners rule. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The two-grant doctrine is the progeny of obscure cases and concep-
tual confusion. There is no basis in precedent or policy for its rebirth in 
Texas deed construction. 185 It is an arbitrary rule that tends to frustrate 
rather than elucidate the parties' intent in direct contravention of the 
consistent mandate that ascertaining intent is the primary goal of deed 
construction. 
Lucke/ should be viewed, in general, as a reaffirmation of the four 
corners rule and a rejection of arbitrary rules, including the two-grant 
doctrine. In construction of multiclause deeds, 186 Lucke/ should again 
be viewed as rejecting the two-grant doctrine and as reaffirming the lib-
183. See Herd, supra note 4, at 647 n.77; Smith, supra note 52, § 15.02[2). 
184. Garrett, 157 Tex. at 94, 299 S.W.2d at 906. See also Herd, supra note 4, at 662 
(suggestsing using the greatest estate possible rule to solve the unique constructional problem 
presented in Stag Sales Co. v. Flores, 697 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ 
ref'd n.r.e.)). As noted in note 168 supra, that case is unusual because the fraction in the 
future-lease clause was 1/16 while the fraction in the granting clause was 1/2. 
185. This does not include the use of the grant and regrant fiction, which has been used 
under the cy pres principle to avoid violations of the rule against perpetuities. See Bagby v. 
Bredthauer, 627 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex. App.-Austin 1981, no writ). 
186. This would require the rejection of the two-grant doctrine for holding that two differ-
ent estates were conveyed, as in Hoffman, as well as that different sizes of interests were con-
veyed at different times, as in Jupiter, simply because a multiclause deed was used. A deed 
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eral approach in Garrett v. Dils Co. that requires harmonizing conflicting 
fractions from the four comers of the deed. To further promote title 
stability, the Texas Supreme Court should be responsive to the unique 
problems caused by the estate misconception and the history behind the 
multiclause deed and adopt specific rules for guidance. The rules sug-
gested in Part IV would refine the approach used in Garrett and reaf-
firmed in Lucke/. The rules for deed construction in Texas are 
sufficiently malleable to permit adoption of this approach against charges 
that it confuses construction with reformation or violates the parol evi-
dence rule. Moreover, unlike the two-grant doctrine, the harmonizing 
approach will preserve the sanctity of the parties' intent. 
After Lucke/, it is clear the repugnant-to-the-grant doctrine is no 
longer a definitive rule of deed construction in Texas. Whether the Gar-
rett approach or the two-grant doctrine should be hailed as its successor, 
however, is not clear. Lucke/ simultaneously approves of Garrett's har-
monizing approach and other cases that used the Hoffman facet of the 
two-grant doctrine. In Jupiter Oil the court inanely distinguishes Alford 
and ignores Lucke/ 's harmonizing approach. Instead, the court bla-
tantly uses the expansion facet of the two-grant doctrine that requires 
accepting conflicting fractions at face value. Therefore, the current state 
of the law for construing multiclause deeds with conflicting fractions is 
unclear. At the earliest opportunity, the Texas Supreme Court should 
provide clarity by adopting the Garrett approach and specific rules for 
harmonizing these deeds, and by expressly renouncing a rebirth of the 
two-grant doctrine. 
should not be construed as making two grants unless there is additional evidence of such 
intent. 
